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I.

ARGUMENT

A. RESPONDENT FAILED TO FILE HIS COMPLAINT FOR ADDITIONAL
INCOME BENEFITS UNTIL JULY 20, 2016, WHICH WAS MORE THAN ONE
YEAR AFTER SURETY'S LAST PAYMENT OF INCOME BENEFITS ON JUNE
22, 201S, AND THUS, FACIALLY UNTIMELY FOR STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS PURPOSES UNDER IDAHO CODE§ 72-706(3). BECAUSE THE
STATUTE IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR
CONSTRUING THE PHRASE "DATE OF LAST PAYMENT OF INCOME
BENEFITS" IN THE MANNER ARGUED FOR BY RESPONDENT SO AS TO
GIVE HIM MORE THAN ONE YEAR WITHIN WIDCH TO HAVE FILED HIS
COMPLAINT

What this case ultimately is about is whether Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) bars Austin's claim
for additional income benefits. The statute provides that "if income benefits have been paid and
discontinued more than four (4) years from the date of the accident causing injury ... the claimant
shall have one ( 1) year from the date of the last payment of income benefits within which to make
and file with the Commission an application requesting a hearing for additional income benefits."
The case, however, has been caught up with issues over what "last payment" means and how it
relates to the actual date when Austin filed his Complaint for additional income benefits; over
whether Idaho Code § 72-806 required a written notice of change of status when Surety issued to
Austin, in care of his attorney, its check for the concluding payment of the monetary value of
Austin's 11 % whole person permanent physical impairment (PPI) rating; over whether Idaho Code
§ 72-604 tolled Idaho Code§ 72-706(3); and over whether Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) was not tolled

because Surety substantially complied with Idaho Code § 72-806 through the information it
provide to Austin and his attorney on the written statement attached to the concluding PPI payment.
In this Reply Brief, Appellants will first address Austin's argument that independent of any
issues regarding Idaho Code§ 72-806 and § 72-604 pertaining to tolling of the statute of limitation,
the Court should, nonetheless, affirm the Commission's determination that his Complaint was
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timely filed under the one year limitation provision of Idaho Code § 72-706(3). He argues that the
phrase "from the date of last payment of income benefits" is "ambiguous." Respondent's Brief,
p. 15. He contends that the Court should construe the date of last payment on income benefits" to
be the date when periodic payments would have ended if all periodic payments had been made biweekly." Respondent's Brief, pages 19-20. Before addressing Austin's argument, however, it is
important to reiterate a number of undisputed and stipulated facts. These facts are relevant not
only tq Austin's statutory construction argument, but also to all the other issues on appeal.
Austin's accident and injury occurred on November 20, 2008. He did not begin incurring
temporary disability, however, until June 2012. Surety paid him total temporary disability benefits
("TTD") for the period of June 9, 2012 through July 18, 2004. In the summer of 2014, Dr. Fellars
declared Austin at maximum medical improvement and rated him as having a permanent physical
impairment (PPI) rating of 11 % whole person.

Surety on July 18, 2014 issued a written Notice

of Claims Status (NOCS) advising Austin that his temporary total disability benefits, based upon
Dr. Fellars' report, would stop effective July 18,2014, and that Surety would start to issue income
benefits to Austin for Dr. Fellar' s 11 % whole person PPI rating. A copy of Dr. Fellars' report was
included with the NOCS.
The NOCS specified that the rating was 11 % whole person, which equated to a value of
$18,694.50, which would be paid at the rate of $339.90 per week, payable bi-weekly. The NOCS
also indicated that payments for the rating would continue until the rating was paid in full.
Surety's payments to Austin of income benefits for PPI commenced on July 19, 2014. On
October 31, 2014, Austin's prior attorney 1 requested a benefit payment summary. The summary
was received on November 20, 2014. The summary included an itemization of the income benefits

1 Austin

was represented by Albert Matsuura until Mr. Matsuura's death in the summer of 2018.
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paid for the permanent impairment rating from lhe start of those payments through the period
ending November 21, 2014. Surety continued to make payments for PPI throughout the remainder
of 2014 and inlo June 2015.
On June 22, 2015, Surety issued check 270024820 payable to Austin in care of his
attorney. The payment amount was $2,379.30. The check also had a written "Statement" attached
to it. The Statement instructed the recipient to ' DETACH AND RETAIN THIS STATEMENT
THE ATTACHED CHECK IS IN PAYMENT OF ITEMS DESCRIBED BELOW." The
Statement indicated that the check was in lhe amount of $2,379.30; lhat it was payment for
"Permanent Partial Scheduled/Impairment [;]" and thal il was "PPI Final Payment."

It is also undisputed and stipulated that 270024820, issued June 22, 2015, cleared Surety's
bank on July 10, 2015. From the clearance date, it can be inferred that Austin and his attorney did,
in fact, receive the check and its attached Statement prior to July 10, 2015.
Austin's attorney did not file a Complaint with the Industrial Commission on Austin's
behalf for additional income benefits until July 20, 2016, more than a year after issuance on June
22, 2015 Surety's concluding payment of income benefits for PPL
Austin's permanent physical impairment rating of 11 % whole person converted to 55
weeks of income benefits (500 weeks x .11 = 55 weeks) payable at a weekly rate of $339.90 for a
total monetary value of $18,694.50 ($339.90 x 55 = $18,694.50). Surety's first biweekly payment
was issued for the period July 19, 2014 through August 1, 2014. Joint Exhibit B. As of the
payment in November 2014 for the period from November 8, 2014 through November 21 , 2014,
Surety had made 9 biweekly payments, or payments for 18 of the 55 weeks of benefits. Joint
Exhibit B. Surety continued to make the biweekly payments during the remainder of 2014 and
into June 2015. As of the period ending June 19, 2015, it had completed 24 periodic payments or
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the equivalent or 48 weeks. Surety then elected to pay the 7 weeks balance of benefits left as of
June 20, 2015 in a single sum, resulting in issuance on June 22, 2015 of the "PPI Final Payment"
check for$ 2,379.30 ($2,379.30 I $339.90 = 7).
As previously noted, Austin argues that independent of any issues regarding Idaho Code §
72-806 and§ 72-804, the Court should, nonetheless, affirm the Commission's determination that
his Complaint was timely filed under the one year limitation provision of Idaho Code§ 72-706(3).
He argues the phrase "from the date of last payment of income benefits" is "ambiguous."
Respondent's Brief, p. 15. He contends that the Court should construe the date of last payment on
income benefits" to be the date when periodic payments would have ended if all periodic payments
had been made bi-weekly." Respondent's Brief, pages 19-20.
The first problem with Austin's argument is that Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) is not ambiguous.
the words "last payment" are plain on their face, unambiguous, and require no interpretation. Wellsettled Idaho law provides that statutory words must be given "their plain, usual and ordinary
meanings."' Salinas v. Bridgeview Estates, 162 Idaho 91, 93,394 P. 3d 793, 795 (2017). Black's

Law Dictionary defines "payment" as "the performance of an obligation by the delivery of money
or some other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharges of the obligation." Black's Law

Dictionary 1243 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 9 th ed., West 2009). Merriam-Webster defines the adjective
"last" as "the next before the present: most recent."

Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary,

hllm,,://www .mcrriam-wcbster.com/dictionarv/la-.t (accessed August 9, 2017). Thus, by definition,

"last payment" means the most recent delivery of money in partial or full discharge of an
obligation.

That occurred with issuance of the concluding payment for PPI on June 22, 2015.

The phrase "final payment" is clear on its face . It strains credulity to contend that the phrase needs
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to be otherwise construed, particularly in Austin's case where the final payment check issued June
22, 2015 stated that it was a "PPI Final Payment."

Second, the date of issuance as the date of payment is consistent with Court case law
interpreting Idaho Code 72-706(3). In Nelson v. City of B01111ers Ferry, 149 Idaho 29, 232 P.3d
807 (2010), Nelson had been injured on October 13, 2000. The State Insurance Fund (SIF) paid
Nelson various types of income benefits for intermittent periods of time between 200 t and 2006.
SIF ended benefit payments on June 5, 2006, Nelson filed a complaint for additional income
benefits on August 23, 2006. The Commission concluded that the Complaint was not timely
because Nelson had not been receiving income benefits on what would have been the four-year
anniversary on October 13, 2004 of his October 13, 2000 accident. Consequently, the Commission
ruled that he only had until the fifth-year anniversary on October 13, 2005 to have filed a complaint
and, since he hadn't done so, his August 23, 2006 complaint was untimely. The Court reversed.

The Court in Nelson reviewed versions of Idaho Code § 72-706 that existed prior to 1991
when the legislature amended subsection (2) and added current subsections (3) and (4). It also
discussed its holding in Walters v. Blincoe 's Magic Valley Packing Co., 117 Idaho 239, 787 P.2d
225 (1989 ), which had been decided under a different statutory scheme.

The Court in Nelson

explained that
As the statute now stands, if the discontinuance occurs before the expiration of
the four-year period, then subsection (2) applies. If the discontinuance occurs after
the expiration of the four-year period, then subsection (3) applies. Under this
construction the claimant would always have at least five years after the accident
or first manifestation within which to file the application for additional income
benefits. That is the obvious reason for choosing the four-year and one-year periods
of time in subsection (3). The combination of the two gives at least five years from
the date of the accident causing injury or first manifestation of the occupational
disease within which to file if income benefits have been paid and discontinued. To
eliminate the inequity that could occur if those benefits are discontinued shortly
before or after the expiration of the five-year period, subsection (3) gives the
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claimant one year from the date of the last payment if the discontinuance occurs
"more than four (4) years" from the date of the accident or first manifestation.

In this case, the four-year period expired on October 13, 2004. Although the
payment of income benefits had been discontinued prior to that date and were not
being made on that date, pursuant to I.C. § 72-306(2), [sic] Nelson had one more
year within which to request additional income benefits. The payment of income
benefits resumed on December 2, 2004, before the expiration of that statute of
limitations, and continued after the statute of limitations provided in I.C. § 72306(2) [sic] had run. Under those circumstances, the statute of limitations in LC. §
72-306(3) [sic] should apply.

149 Idaho at 33-34, 232 P. 3d at 812.

Third the Parties stipulated before the Commission that "Defendants issued the final
payment of PPI to Austin in care of his attorney on June 22, 2015, by check number 2700024820
in the amount of $2,379.30." Finding IO.

Fourth, the Commission considered Austin's argument "that the Commission should
consider the date the last payment of benefits would have been due had Surety not made an advance
payment of seven weeks' worth of PPI benefit payments in a "lump sum" fashion. That date is no
earlier than August 8, 2015." See Finding 24. But the Commission implicitly rejected that
argument since it expressly found in Finding 28 that "Surety's last payment of income benefits
occurred on June 22, 2015. Under the provision of Idaho Code § 72-706(3), it appears that
Claimant had until June 22, 2016 to file his complaint, which he did not do."

Fifth, Austin's argument thwarts the clear intent of Idaho Code § 72-706(3) because it
would allow him more than one full year from when the final payment for PPI was issued to file
his Complaint for additional income benefits.
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Sixth, even though Surety's issuance on June 22, 2015 of a concluding payment of 7 weeks
of benefits started the statute of limitations running from then instead of from August 8, 2016.,
Austin and his attorney received one full year to file a Complaint. Nothing regarding Surety's
payment in any way cut short Austin's one year to file a Complaint. Moreover, nothing about the
payment thwarted, limited, affected or prejudiced Austin's one-year right to file a Complaint. A
comment the Referee made in his proposed Finding 58 seems an accurate bottom line assessment
of Austin's argument. "Nothing in the record suggests Claimant had circled August 8, 2016 as the
date by which he had to file suit. Instead it appears from the record he simply failed to file suit by
the time frame allowed by Idaho Code § 72-706(3) and is searching now for a way to escape the
reality of his predicament."

Seventh, the cases from other jurisdictions cited by Austin are not relevant for two reasons.
As noted above, the statutory language is not ambiguous, and Idaho law provides that where
statutory language is unambiguous, then "' legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should
not be consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the legislature."' Verska
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889,893,265 P.3d 502,506 (2011). In such
circumstances, the legislation "'speaks for itself and must be given the interpretation the language
clearly implies."' Id. at 895, 508. The other reason is that the cases cited by Austin illustrate the
danger of relying on cases from other jurisdiction with different statutory frameworks. They
simply do not translate to Idaho's Workers' Compensation Law. This is amply illustrated by the
principal case relied on by Austin, which is Allen v. IBP, Inc., 219 Neb. 424, 363 N. W. 2d 520
(1985).
As noted in the Allen court's opinion, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-139 (Reissue 1984) required
that a commutation of periodic payments for permanent disability "or claimed permanent
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disability" be submitted to the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court for approval. Id. at 426,
523. Nebraska had a related statute, Neb. Rev. Stat.§ 48-140 (Reissue 1984), which required that
all settlement agreements had to be approved by the compensation court and would not "final and
not subject to readjustment" unless the agreement had been submitted and approved. Id.
Furthermore, since 1933 the Nebraska Supreme Court had construed "'[a] commuted award"' as
extending "'over the full period originally covered by the same."' Id. at 426-427, 523.
Allen was injured on January 16, 1979. IBP paid him 12 weeks of temporary total disability
benefits. Then on October 25, 1979, IBP paid Allen a lump sum payment of $2,223.26, which
represented 288 weeks of compensation for a 5% permanent partial disability. No settlement or
release was ever executed, and the lump sum payment was not approved by the compensation
court. In 1982, Allen began experiencing further temporary disability. Allen brought a proceeding
before the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Court in 1982 for additional compensation.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-137 provided for a two-year statute of limitation "in any case" when
payments of compensation had been made but which "shall not take effect until the expiration of
two years from the time of the making of the last payment." Id. at 425-426, 522-523. The pivotal
issue in the case was whether the two-year statute of limitation began to run from the October 25,
1979 lump sum payment by IBP; or whether, because there had not court approval of the lump
sum, the statute of limitation began "to run when the last of the 288 weekly payments would have
been paid had then been paid periodically[.]" Id. at 426, 523. In the initial proceeding below
before a single judge, Allen's petition for additional benefits was dismissed. Id. at 424, 522. Allen
sought rehearing from a three-judge panel, which reversed the sole judge and awarded benefits to
Allen. Id. IBP then appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court, which affirmed the award to Allen.
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It is apparent that the Court affirmed because of the statutory framework which required
compensation court approval and its holding concerning the scope of a commuted award. It stated,
Where compensation has been commuted by agreement and paid in a lump sum
without court approval, § 48-139, such a payment is not final; it is nothing more
than an advance payment, and the statute of limitation does not begin to run until
the last periodic payment would have been paid, had payments been made in
installments. To hold otherwise would, as here, permit employers to thwart
claims of employees by imposing finality contrary to applicable statutes.
Id. at 427-428, 523-524 (Emphasis added). In short, the logic of Allen has no relevance to Austin's
case.
For the above reasons, the Court should reject Austin's argument and should conclude, as
the Commission did in Finding 28, that "Surety's last payment of income benefits occurred on
June 22, 2015[,]" and that "[u]nder the provision of Idaho Code§ 72-706(3) . . . Claimant had
until June 22, 2016 to file his complaint, which he did not do." Of Course, the Court must go on
to address the appellate issues involving Idaho Code § 72-806 and § 72-604, since, the
Commission, after finding that Austin's Complaint was facially untimely, also correctly noted at
the end of Finding 28 that "the requirements of Idaho Code of Idaho Code § 72706(3) may be
tolled under certain circumstances."

B. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS MATTER OF LAW IN DETERMINING THAT
IDAHO CODE§ 72-806 REQUIRED SURETY TO ISSUE A NOTICE OF CHANGE
OF STATUS WHEN IT COMPLETED PAYMENT ON JUNE 22, 2015 OF THE
INCOME BENEFITS FOR RESPONDENT'S 11 % WHOLE PERSON
PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT RATING
Austin argues that the Commission correctly concluded that Idaho Code § 72-806 required
a written notice of change of status when the Surety made the concluding payment of the monetary
value of Austin's 11 % whole person permanent physical impairment (PPI) rating because the
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concluding payment ..was a change in the status or condition of Mr. Austin's income benefits."
Respondent's Brief, p. 7. (Emphasis in original.)
Idaho Code § 72-806 states, in part, that "A workman shall receive written notice within
fifteen ( 15) days of any change or status or condition, including, but not limited to, the denial,
reduction or cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or
indirectly affects the level to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled."
The Commission in its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration at page 3 stated that
Idaho Code § 72-806 "requires a NCOS when PPI benefits stop" because "[t]he plain language of
the statute treats the cessation or final payment of PPI benefits the same as other benefits, such as
cessation of medical and/or monetary compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects
the level to which he might presently or ultimately be entitled "for a NCOS from Defendants."
Earlier, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, the Commission reasoned on page
14 that because Austin's ..periodic payment of PPI benefits ... came to an end[,]" "[t]hen the level
(amount) of money periodically received was therefore '°affected"' by the receipt of the last
payment, for Claimant received no further payments thereafter." Thus, reasoned the Commission,
the "plain language of the statute" required a notice of change of status.
What Austin and the Commission, however, both fail to adequately address is that in
construing a statute to determine the plain, usual, and ordinary meaning of its language, "effect
must be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous,
or redundant."

Twin Lakes Canal Co. v. Choules, 151 Idaho 214,216,254 P. 3d 1210, 1212

(2011 ). (Emphasis added.)
The critical point regarding Idaho Code § 72-806 is that a cessation of benefits alone is not
what triggers the need for written notice. The triggering event is the "cessation of ... monetary
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compensation benefits, which directly or indirectly affects the level to which he might presently
or ultimately be entitled." (Emphasis added.) In Austin's case, however, the level of benefits to
which he "might ... be entitled" did not change when the "PPI Final Payment" was issued on June
22, 2015.
The Parties stipulated that Surety provided a written notice of change of status to Austin
on July 18, 2014, advising him he had reached maximum medical improvement and had been
given a permanent physical impairment rating of I I~ whole person by Dr. Fellars. Further, the
NOCS informed Austin that he was entitled to income benefits for impairment rating in the total
amount or S 18,694.50 to be paid bi-weekly at the rate of $339.90 per week until the rating was
"paid in full." Additionally, the Parties also stipulate that Surety made payments against the
impairment award until it was paid in full on June 22, 2015, with a check marked "PPI Final
Payment" in the amount of $2,379.30.
The benefit of $18,694.50 to which Austin became entitled was determinable and lixed in
2014 as soon as he was rated as having a PPI of 11 % whole person. At the time the NOCS was
issued on July 18, 2014 those benefits were prospective. They were a level or benefits to which
Austin " might presently or ultimately be entitled." Hence, an NOCS was required under Idaho
Code § 72-806 in 20 I 4 when the rating occurred. Surety met that obligation with the NOCS it
sent to Austin on July 18, 2014. When, however, completion of payment of the rating occurred
on June 22, 2015, it did not change the level of the rating benefit All that occurred when the "PPI
Final Payment" was made is that that the rating benefit completed the movement from a
prospective benefit to one fully .iclualized. The level of benefits did not change. Austin received
exuctly what he was told he would receive in the July 18, 2014 NOCS. The "PPI Final Payment"
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did not "affect" the "level" of the "monetary compensation benefits'' lo which Austin "might ...
be entitled."
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should conclude that the Commission erred as a matter
of law in determining that a notice of change of status wa~ required because of the June 22, 2014
"PPI Final Paymenl.''

C. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER IN CONCLUDING THAT SURETY
ACTED WILFULLY WHEN IT FAILED TO ISSUE A FORM 8 NOTICE OF
CHANGE OF STATUS WHEN IT COMPLETED PAYMENT ON JUNE 22, 2015
OF THE INCOME BENEFITS FOR RESPONDENT'S 11 % PERMANENT
PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT RATING
Austin next makes two arguments. Au!>tin next makes two arguments. These are based on
a conclusion that a notice of change of status was required by ldaho Code § 72-806 when the "PPI
Final Payment'" was made. The first of his two arguments is that the Commission correctly
determined that Surety's failure to file such an NOCS was "willful" under Idaho Code § 72-604,
and, therefore, that the statute of Iimitation of Idaho Code § 72-706(3) was tolled by § 72. 604.
Reply Brief, pages I 0-12,
The Commission in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order merely stnted in
Finding 46 that "Because Defendants did not is!>Ue the required Idaho Code § 72-806 notice, the
limitation provisions of Idaho Code § 72-706 are tolled by operation of Idaho Code § 72-604.''
The Commission did not make specific findings over whether Surety "willfully fail[ed] or
refuse[d] to file the report as required ... by section 72-806, Idaho Code[.]" A willful failure to
refusal to file is an essential requirement under Idaho Code § 72-604. The Commission, however,
sought to remedy the apparent deficiency in its Order Denying Request for Reconsideration.
The Commission made two points in the latter Order. First, it !-,lated that "a finding of
willfulness is implicit in our finding that the plain language of the statute [§ 72-806] requires a
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NOCS upon the cessation of any class of benefits. Therefore, we specifically conclude that
Defendants' failure was willful us anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-604." Second, it ci1ed its
decision in Mead v. Sw{/i Transportation, 2015 IIC 0041 (2015), for the proposilion that when a
defendant is "aware of the legal requirements of the statute requiring filing, but failed" to make a
required filing, then the failure, "[a]lthough not malicious [,]" is "willful." ln then concluded
regarding Austin's case that "becam,e there is no ambiguity in the plain language of statute
requiring a NOCS when there is a cessation of benefits, Defendant's failure to submit the NOCS
was similarly without lawful excu~e and willful."
Appellants contend that the Commission erred us a matter of law in concluding that the
failure to submit an NOCS wa.,; willful because it never considered whether the fact!-. raised issues
as to whether there were lawful grounds to excuse Surety's failure to file an NOCS upon the "PPI
Final Payment,'' assuming such an NOCS was required.
More specilically, Appellunts argue in their Opening Brief that Court has recognized
variou~ excuse!-> legally sufficient to preclude a finding that conduct was "willful." Appellants
further argue that the Court's decision in Poss

11.

MeekerMachine Shop, I 09 Idaho 921, 923, 7 I 2

P. 2d 621, 626 ( 1985) implies that substantial compliance with Idaho Code § 72-806 may be such
an exception.
Appellant's argument is contained at pages 13-19 of their Opening Brief and will not be
repeated here. Appellants, however, reiterate here their conclusion that the Commi!.Sion erred a!.
a maller of law by failing to consider whether "substantial compliance" with

*72-806 is a cause

sufficient to legally excused the failure lo file an NOCS when payment of a PPI rating is completed.
Appellant~ then proceeded al pages 19 through 22 of their Opening Brief to argue thal the
!,tipulated and undisputed facts raised the issue of substantial compliance and that the
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Commission's failed to apply a "substantial compliance" legal standard to those facts. Thal
contention leads to the second of Austin's arguments alluded to above.

Austin argues that

Appellants failed to establish "substantial compliance.''

D. THE COMMISSION ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT FAILED TO
APPLY A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE STANDARD TO THE STIPULATED
AND UNDISPUTED FACTS TO DETERMINE WHETHER LEGALLY
SUFFICIENT REASON EXISTS TO EXCUSE SURETY'S FAILURE TO ISSUE A
FORM 8 NOTICE OF CHANGE OF STATUS WHEN IT COMPLETED
PAYMENT ON JUNE 22, 2015 OF THE INCOME BENEFITS FOR
RESPONDENT'S 11 % PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT RA TING

Austin's argument regarding substantial compliance is al pages 13-14 of his Reply Brief.
Essentiully, he claims there was no "substantial compliance" because the Statement Surety
provided with its June 22, 2015 final payment or the PPI rating did not provide Austin with an
"effective date and reasons" for why his PPI payments were ending. His argument doesn't make
logical sense, as will become clear shortly.
The Commission has adopted a form known as Form 8 for reporting a "Notice of Claim
Status'' for purpose-; of Idaho Code § 72-806.
The Commission's Form 8 can be found at Idaho Industrial Commission, Find a Form,
Adjuster Forms, Notice of Change of Status (IC - 8), https://iic.idaho.!.!o\/find-a-form/. A copy
of a Form 8 can also be found in the Agency Record at p. 3 la. That copy of the Form 8 a is part
of the Commission's "Advanced Level Student Book" which the Commission took judicial notice
of pursuant to Referee's Order Granting Motion for Judicial Notice of Publication of the Idaho
Industrial Commission. R., pp. 73-74. The "Advanced Level Student Book" is used by the
Commission's Claims and Benefits Department for its Certified Idaho Workers Compensation
Specialist Learning Course. See R., p. 34.
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The Form 8 says that "This is to notify you of the DENIAL OR CHANGE OF STATVS
of your workers• compensation in the statement checked below." The first box on Form 8 is for
"Your claims is denied" and the box asks for a "Reason." The second box is for "Your benefit
payment will be" either "Reduced" or "Increased." That box also asks for a "Reason" and requires
an "Effective Date." The third box is for "Your benefit payments will be stopped." It also asks
for a "Reason" and an "Effective Date." The fourth box is for "You claim is being investigated"
and requests a date for when "A decision should be made by." The fifth box is for "Other" and
request an "Explanation" and an "Effective Date."
Appellants contend that the Statement attached to the final PPI payment check contained
all the material information that would have been contained on a Form 8 Form. In assessing the
facts as they relate to the issue of substantial compliance, it's important to start with the July 18.
2014 NOCS for context.

Austin and his attorney were aware from that NOCS that Austin had

received an permanent rating 11 % of the whole person from Dr. Fellars, that the total monetary
value of the rating was $18,694.50, and that it would be paid out in bi-weekly installments at the
rate of $339.90 per week "until the award has been paid in full." The Statement attached to the
June 22, 2015 check for $2,379.30 clearly indicated that the payment was for "Permanent Partial
Scheduled/Impairment" "From" 06/20/2015. and that the payment was the "PPI Final Payment."
Both the check and the Statement also contained the amount of the check and the check date of
"06/22/2015." Thus, Austin and his attorney were aware from the Statement that there would be
no further payment of income benefits for permanent impairment after June 22, 20 l 5 because the
permanent impairment rating had been fully paid out with the check of June 22, 2015.
Consequently, contrary to Austin's assertion, the Statement clearly informed him that his PPI
benefits were stopping effective June 22, 2015. and that they were stopping because the June 22,
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2015 check fully paid out his impairment. That's why Austin's argument makes no sense.
Moreover, the above facts unquestionably raise an issue of "substantial compliance" with Idaho
Code§ 72-806 which the Commission did not address. That, in Appellant's judgment, is reversible
error.
II.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons contained herein and in Appellants' Opening Brief, the Court enter a
decision in favor of Appellants on all issues raised on appeal.
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